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BANKS

AND

BANKING-NATIONAL

UTE CREATING PREFERENCES

BANKS-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF STAT-

AMONG CREDITORS-A Pennsylvania statute pro-

vides that in liquidating an insolvent trust company, priority is to be given to

the depositors over other creditors. Both a trust company and a national
bank became insolvent on the same day. The trust company owned 93 per cent.
of the stock of the national bank. The receiver of the latter claimed that the
liability of the trust company upon the stock which it owned entitled him,
under § 23 of the Federal Reserve Act,' to share pari passn with the depositors;
that the state act preferring depositors impaired the efficiency of the national
banking system and was unconstitutional. Held: The statute is constitutional
and depositors have priority. In re Cameron, 287 Pa. 56o, 135 Atl. 295 (1926).
Since national banks are instrumentalities of the Federal Government, created by statutes for a public purpose, it is axiomatic that any state act which
either impairs the efficiency of this agency or expressly conflicts with those
statutes is unconstitutional
But by the very nature of their daily business,
national banks are governed far more by laws of the state than of the nation.
All their contracts, their acquisitions and transfers of property, their right to
sue and liability to be sued are based on state law." In the principal case, the
state declared the order in which the assets of a corporation were to be distributed. The dissenting judge reasoned, on analogy to the tax cases, that when
a national bank is numbered among the creditors, the influence exercised by
the state could be carried to such an extent as to arrest the national power
entirely: the power to prefer is the power to exempt from liability4 Although the problem raised in the principal case seems never before to have
been decided, on principle the conclusion of the majority of the court seems
the sounder. The statute is not in express conflict with the federal statute,
the sole effect of which is to make the national bank a creditor of its stock'Act of 1913, P. L. 354, 355, PA. STAT. (1920) § 6341.
238 STAT. (1913) 273, U. S. COMP. STAT. (1918) § 9689.
'Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275 (1895);- Christopher v.
2Ol U. S. 216 (19o5); First. Nat Bank v. California, 262 U. S. 366

Norvell,

First Nat Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640 (1924).
Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 22o (1902); Allen v. Carter, 1g Pa. 192
(1888) (criminal statute making it a misdemeanor for bank cashier. to engage in other business did not apply to national banks) ; BURilcK, THE AMERIcAN CONSTITUTION (1922)
§ 168; COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
(6th Ed. 189o) 28.
"Nat Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353 (U. S. I869), in which the court
said at 362: "It is only when the state law incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional";
McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347 (1896) (statute prohibiting preferences
by an insolvent debtor is constitutional and applies to preferences given to a
(1923);
4

national bank).

'287 Pa. at 571, 135 Atl. at 298, citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316 (U. S. 1819). In that case, Marshall, C. J., said at 487: "That the power
to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat
and render useless the power to create . . . are propositions not to be denied."
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The state admittedly governs all the contracts by which a national
holders
bank secures rights, and it is uniformly held that the regulation of priorities
Debts
between creditors is not an impairment of the obligation of contracts
to the United States have been subordinated to personal exemptions given to
It cannot, therefore, be said that the statute under condebtors by statute
struction is analogous to a taxing statute, or that it impairs the utility of an
instrumentality of the Federal Government.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-INTERSTATE

COMMERCE-STATE

REGULATION

OF

INTRASTATE BusrNEss OF MOTOR Bus ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE-

A statute forbids the operation of any motor vehicle upon a public way in
any city or town for the carriage of passengers for hire so as to afford a means
of transportation similar to that afforded by a railway company, by indiscriminately receiving and discharging passengers along the route on which
the vehicle is operated, without first obtaining a license from the cities through
which it is operated. No license is required in respect to such carriage as
may be exclusively interstate1 The defendant, the Holyoke Street Railway
Company has been a common carrier of passengers by street railway in Massachusetts. Plaintiff is engaged in the business of transporting passengers for
hire by motor vehicle and operates busses between Hartford, Connecticut, and
Greenfield, Massachusetts. Both classes of passengers, intrastate and interstate, are carried in the same vehicles. The operation of the busses in competition with the street railway has resulted in substantial loss to the latter.
Plaintiff has not obtained a license from any of the cities and towns served
by the street railway company; and that company has caused plaintiff's employees to be arrested and prosecuted and intends to continue to do so. The
plaintiff brought suit to restrain the enforcement of the statute as in conflict
with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. Held: The
statute is constitutional. Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co.,
U. S. Sup. Ct, decided January 3, 1927.
No regulation has been enacted by Congress respecting motor bus and
motor truck transportation, and so the states, within their respective jurisdic'The language of the Federal Reserve Act, supra note 2, is: "The stockholders of every national banking association shall be held individually responsible for all contracts, debts and engagements of such association, each to
the amount of his stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the
amount invested in such stock."
"Abilene Nat Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. i (1913); Central Trust Co. v.

Charlotte, etc., R. R., 65 Fed. 257 (C. C. D. S. C. 1894); Ellerbe v. United
Masonic Benefit Ass'n., I14 Mo. 501, 21 S. W. 843 (1892).
"Fink v. O'Neil, 1O6 U. S. 272 (1882) ; Jones' Estate, 84 Pa. Super. 170
(1924) (a claim of exemption under the Fiduciaries Act of 1917 was held valid
as against a debt of decedent due to the United States).

'Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 159 §45, as amended by Acts, 1925 c. 28o
§§ 1-3. The statutory provisions in question have been sustained by the highest
court of Massachusetts: New York, etc., R. R. v. Deister, 253 Mass. 178, 148
N. E. 590 (1925); Burrows v. Farnums Stage Lines, 254 Mass. 240, i5o
N. E. 206 (1926).
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tions, have power to act in matters local in nature admitting of different systems of regulation drawn from local knowledge and conforming to local
wants,' subject to the limitation implied from the interstate commerce clause
of the Constitution that they cannot legislate as to matters "imperatively
demanding a single uniform rule,"' and that in general they cannot directly
interfere with or burden interstate commerce regardless of the purpose for
which the legislation was enacted.' The Supreme Court has decided that
interstate motor transportation does not require such uniformity of regulation
as to prevent all state regulation. Reasonable state regulations concerning the
use of its highways have been sustained in the interest of public safety even
as to interstate vehicles.' The fact that the obtaining of a certificate of convenience and necessity cannot be required by the state authorities so far as
interstate commerce is involved' does not invalidate the requirements of the
statute so far as they are within the power of the state. The present statute
is restricted to intrastate vehicles. The purpose of the act is to regulate
local and intrastate affairs. While the purpose of the act is immaterial, if
it directly burdens interstate commerce, the burden is on the party contesting
its constitutionality to show that it operates to prejudice interstate carriage
of passengers. Although the present statute does, after a fashion, interfere
with the interstate commerce of the plaintiff, yet the court felt that the interference, if any, is slight; that it would be reasonably practical for the plaintiff
to separate the two classes of business so as to carry interstate passengers
in busses used exclusively for that purpose; and that the plaintiff should not
be allowed to evade the act by the mere linking of its intrastate to its interstate
transportation or by unnecessary transportation of both classes by means of
the same instrumentalities and employees.

OF

CoNsTrrumoAL LAW-POWER OF ErrHER HOUSE TO COmPEL ATTENDANCE
WrrNEsss-The defendant ignored a subpona which commanded him to

appear and testify before a Senate committee which was investigating the
administration of the Department of Justice. He was then taken into custody
by order of the Senate, whereupon he obtained a writ of habeas corpus on
which he was discharged from custody by the lower court. Held: The dfendant was properly held in custody and the lower court erred in discharging
him. McGrain v. Daugherty, 47 Sup. Ct. 319 (U. S. 1927).

In this decision, which reverses Ex parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620 (S. D.
Ohio 1924), the Supreme Court lays down the principle that the Senate or House
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 2W, 318 (U. S. 1851). See also
the language of Mr. Justice Hughes in Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
399 (1912).
'Language of Mr. Justice Curtis in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra
note 2.
'Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, 199 (1924) ; Real Silk Mills
v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 336 (1924).
'Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 61o (1914); Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U. S. 16o (I916).
'Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1914). The fact that in this case
the 'highway in question had been built with federal aid has been held not
determinative.

See Bush v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317 (1924).
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"has power, through its own process, to compel a private individual to appear
before it or onq of its committees and give testimony needed to enable it efficiently to exercise a legislative function belonging to it under the Constitution."
The case is in accord with practically all cases which have been decided in the

United States and in England. For a complete discussion of the question involved and a thorough review of the historical background and the English
and American authorities, see Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for
Contempt, 74 U. oF PA. L. REv. 691, 780 (1926).
CORPORATIONS-DISSOLUTION-EFFECT OF PRioR ADJUDICATION OF BANKRUPTcY-The defendant corporation was adjudicated bankrupt. Subsequently
the State's attorney brought an action for its dissolution. Certain stockholders
intervened, questioning the jurisdiction of a state to dissolve a corporation which
at the time was in the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy. Held: The court had
jurisdiction to dissolve the corporation. State v. Farmers' Co-op. Packing Co.,
211 N. W. 602 (S. Dak. 1926).
The court's reasoning proceeded along the line that there was no conflict in jurisdiction between the judgment of dissolution and the authority of
the bankruptcy court, since the dissolution of a corporation is a province that
is peculiar to the state and the adjudication in bankruptcy with the consequent
distribution of assets are matters within the cognizance of the federal goverment. And, insofar as the judgment of dissolution appoints a receiver to
distribute the assets of the corporation among the stockholders, the authority
and functions of the receiver are postponed and supplementary to the trustee's
distribution. It is well settled that mere bankruptcy does not work a dissolution
of a corporation. It is also settled that a dissolution of a corporation will not
bar a subsequent adjudication in bankruptcy. Conversely, the principal case
holds that an adjudication of a corporation will not bar a later dissolution. It
is of unusual interest since it seems that only one similar case has heretofore
arisen 3 The conclusion of the court appears to be sound and logical, in view of
the following considerations: (i) since the state is the creator of a corporation, it can destroy the existence of the corporation for cause; (2) there is
no conflict in the spheres of the federal and state duties; and (3) though the
corporation be dissolved, the trustee can still be assisted by the officers in gathering the assets. The decision, however, may be attacked on the grounds that
the dissolution of a bankrupt corporation is a vain and useless insistence on a
'Chemical Nat. Bank v. Hartford Deposit Co., i6i U. S. i (1896);
Chamberlin v. Huguenot Mfg. Co., II8 Mass. 532 (1875); i RE:mINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY (2d Ed. 1915) §4512.
'In re Independent Ins. Co., 6 Nat. B. R. 169 (D. C. Mass. 1872); White
Mountain Paper Co. v. Morse, I27 Fed. 643 (C. C. A. ist, 1904); I REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note i § io; BLACK, BANKRUPTCY (4th Ed. 1926) § 230.
3
Hart v. Boston R. L, 40 Conn. 524 (1873). In BLACK, 1oC. cit. supra
note 2, is the following: "This may be a correct doctrine, so far as regards a
mere decree of dissolution. But no federal court could be expected to admit that
the process of the state court could extend to property within its control, or
in any manner regulate its administration or distribution. For the jurisdiction
of a federal court, once attaching in bankruptcy proceedings is not coordinate
with that of the state courts, but superior and exclusive." -
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legal right by the state, since bankrupt corporations normally die a natural
death and the action for dissolution merely hastens that ending with no apparent benefit; that the public needs no protection against the corporation because
bankruptcy is a public act; and, finally, that the federal authorities have exclusive control of the assets.
CORPORATIONS-INCoRPORATION

OF PARTNERSHIP-LIABILITY

ON

CONTRACT

OF LATTER-This suit was brought to recover damages for wrongful discharge

in breach of an alleged contract of employment. Four partners, doing business
as A. B. Kirschbaum & Co., entered into a contract of employment with the
plaintiff, calling for sixty days notice by either party, in the event of a desire
to terminate. The agreement was signed in the partnership name by one partner and its terms were known to one other partner. There was no dispute as to
the authority to bind the firm. A year later, the partners incorporated, becoming the four principal officers and holding nearly all of the stock. The
corporation continued to employ the plaintiff for eleven years and then discharged him without giving the notice stipulated in the old agreement. The
defense of the corporation was that the obligation was not created by a majority of the promoters and adopted by the corporation with knowledge thereof.
Held: The contract was entered into by a majority of the promoters, and the
corporation, since it did not disaffirm it, was bound. Moskowitz v. A. B. Kirschbaum Co., 89 Pa. Super. 274 (1926).

As a general rule, a corporation is not bound on the contracts of its promoters but it may become liable on a new contract containing similar terms.
The courts variously refer to the theory of liability as ratification, adoption,
novation, or the acceptance of an open offer.2 Save for certain cases, presently
to be mentioned, it is essential that the corporation by express words or conduct, indicate an intention to be bound.! The idea that a corporation could
become obligated on contracts made by a majority of its promoters, for services necessary in the organization of the company, by the mere formal act of
incorporation and perforce the acceptance of the benefits of past labors, was
first expounded in a group of English cases decided by Lord Cottenham, Despite the fact that these cases have been so seriously criticized in England as
to be of scant value as precedent 5 New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Iowa and
Nebraska have adopted the doctrine Pennsylvania has evidently gone further
'Park v. Modern Woodmen, 181 Ill. 214, 54 N. E. 932 (1899); Bond v.
Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N. Y. Supp. 425 (I91o). In
some states, by statute, a corporation is liable for the expenses of incorporation.
' Richards, Liability of Corporationson Contracts Made by Promoters, ig
HARv. L. Rxv. 97 (i9o5).
'Whitney v. Wyman, ioi U. S. 392 (i879); Pratt v. Oshkosh Match Co.,
89 Wis. 4o6, 62 N. W. 84 (1895).
"Edward v. Grand junction Ry. Co., I Myl. & Cr. 650 (836) ; Stanley v.
Chester & B. Ry. Co., 9 Sim. "264 (1838); Webb v. L. & P. Ry. Co., 9 Hare
129 (I8si).

'Richards, supra note
'

2.

Stevenson v. Dubuque Level & Lead Co., 34 Iowa 577 (1872) ; Low v.

R. R., 45 N. H. 370 (1864); Clarke v. Omaha, etc., Ry. Co., 5 Neb. 314
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than the other jurisdictions by applying the principle to a case involving a
contract of promoters calling for services to be rendered after incorporatiofi.
The court in the principal case cites these decisions, and decides the case on
the ground that an authorized contract made by one partner is the contract
of all four, and knowledge of its terms is imputable to all of them. A majority of the promoters therefore did in fact make this agreement. The notion
that a majority of promoters must unite in the promise is logically spurious
and not generally accepted.8 The true ground of liability, as was stated above,
being the formation of a new contract on terms similar to the old, what difference should it make whether one or all of the promoters entered into the
agreement?
GIFTS CAUSA

MORTIS--REvoCATION

BY SUBSEQUENT

BIRTH

OF CHILD TO

DoNoR-This was an action by an administrator to recover on certificates of

stock in the defendant building and loan association. Prior to and in anticipation of her death the decedent handed the stock to one A as a gift to B,
to be delivered to the latter upon the death of the donor. Before her death,
a child was born to the donor. Held: The gift to B was not affected by the
subsequent birth. McCoy v. Shazwee Building and Loan Association, 251 Pac.
194 (Kan. 1926).

No authorities have been found to support the position taken by the court.
A New York case,1 which seems to be the only authority dealing with the
subject, sustains the opposite conclusion, namely, that the subsequent birth of
a child revokes a gift causa inortis. In most states, statutes provide that the
birth of a child under such circumstances revokes a will.? The New York
court first decided that a gift causz inortis was in effect a will ' and from that
premise proceeded to its conclusion on an analogy to the laws of wills. The
early Roman law' provided that the birth of a child revoked a will previously made; in the English ecclesiastical courts this created a presumption
that the testator did not intend such a will to take effect if a child should
be born.5 At common law, however, such an event did not so operate.! The
(1877); Bells Gap R. R. v. Christy, 79 Pa. 54 (1875); Tift v. Quaker City
Nat. Bank, 14r Pa. 550, 21 At. 66o (i8gi).
"Girard v. Case Bros. Cutlery Co., 225 Pa. 327, 74 Atl. 2oi (i9o9). Cf.
Bonner v. Travelers Hotel Co., 276 Pa. 492, 12o Atl. 467 (1923).
'See I7 A. L. R. 469, Note (1922).
'Bloomer v. Bloomer, 2 Bradf. Sur. 339 (N. Y. 1853).
'PAGE, WIL.s (2nd Ed. x926) § 489.
* It would seem that the court's premise is incorrect. A gift causa mortis
takes effect immediately subject to being divested by revocation or by the
donor's recovery. However, a will has no legal effect at the date of its execution, its efficacy depending on the testator's death. Therefore, the two dispositions are clearly distinguishable. See McCoy v. Shawnee B. and L. Ass'n,
251 Pac. at 196.
'Dig., Lib. 28, Tit. 3 §3.
oJohnson v. Wells, 2 Hagg. Eccl. 561 (1829); Fox v. Marston, I Curt.
Eccl. 494 (1837).
I PAGE, op. cit. supra note 2 § 479.
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court in the principal case pertinently directed attention to the fact that the
effect of the child's birth in the will cases is entirely provided for by statute,
and since such statutes made no mention whatever of gifts causa inortis, no
intention to cover the latter situation can possibly be deduced, either directly
or by analogy. In view of this consideration the decision in the principal
case is based on good logic and sound reason.
INFANTS-DISArFIRMANCE

OF CONTRACT--COUNTERCLAIM

FOR DETRIoRA-

TION-Plaintiff, while still an infant, misrepresented to the defendant company
that he was of age, and the latter, relying thereon, in good faith made a contract for the sale to him of an automobile. The plaintiff made part payments
of the price of the car to the extent of $4o6. On coming of age the plaintiff
disaffirmed the contract and sued for the return of the $4o6. The defendant
set up as a counterclaim the amount of $525, which had been expended on the
returned car to put it in as good condition as when it was sold to the plaintiff.
Held: The defendant's counterclaim should be upheld for as much of the
amount paid for the repair of the car as would equal the plaintiff's claim.
Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., U. S. Sup. Ct-, decided Jan. 3, 1927.
The court reached its decision by the application of the equitable maxim,
"he who seeks equity must do equity," and by the further consideration that
in this case there had been actual fraud on the part of the infant. To make
an infant account for the benefit he has received from the use of the property
and for any injury to it, seems only just, when the contract is fair and reasonable. The minority view, represented by England, Maryland, New York and
Oregon, does not consider that the rights of infants are violated by permitting
the seller an allowance for depreciation of the subject matter of the contract
in suits similar to the principal case.' The rules for the protection of infants,
it is held, are to be used as a shield, not as a sword. The majority of courts
are opposed to the principal case, and permit an infant to recover sums paid
on contracts, except for necessities, even though he has used the chattel so
as to render it worthless.! These jurisdictions emphasize the protection of
infants, and refuse to allow indirectly by way of recoupment what could not
be secured directly in a suit against the infant by the seller. Two jurisdictions, Minnesota and New Hampshire, permit the seller an allowance for
depreciation of the returned chattel where the contract has been fair, reasonable, and provident, taking into account the infant's situation.3 So it was held
provident for one infant to make a contract for a multigraph machine, and
he had to make an allowance to the seller for its deterioration. On the other
'Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. i66 (1889); Adams v. Beall, 67 Md.
53, 8 At. 664 (1887); Wanisch v. Wuertz, i4o N. Y. Supp. 573 (1913);
Pettit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, I9i Pac. 66o, ii A. L. R. 487 (I92O).
2
Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975
(i924);

Hauser v. Marmon Chicago Co., 208 Ill.
App. 171 (1917); Gillis v.

Goodwin, i8o Mass. i4o, 6i N. E. 813 (i9oi).
'This
view is favored in I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §238.
4
Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, i6o N. W.
191 (i916).
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hand it was held improvident for another infant in a particular situation to
purchase an automobile, and he was allowed to recover the whole sum paid.'
The decision in the principal case based on the deterioration of the property
used by the infant, coupled with his misrepresentation, seems more satisfactory
than the view of the majority giving the infant an absolute right to recover
under all circumstances.
INSURANCE-MUTUAL

COMPANEEs-TAXATION

OF

LEGAL

REsERVE-The

plaintiff, a mutual life insurance company, had accumulated a legal reserve of
$186,ooo,ooo, of which $7,0oo,ooo had been derived from paid-in premiums
of policyholders. The company in its report for the War Excess Profits Tax
assessment 1 included the legal reserve as invested capital. The Collector of
Revenue held that the legal reserve was not invested capital under the Act,
which exempted as invested capital the cash value of "shares or stocks" in
corporations or partnerships? This ruling excluded the legal reserve, and
thus reduced the invested capital of the company to a figure where it bore
such a relation to the income as to make the latter subject to the tax. Held:
The actual paid-in legal reserve ($7ooooooo) was invested capital. Duffy v.
Mutiwl Benefit Life Ins. Co., 47 Sup. Ct. 2o5 (1926).
The theory of the court was that the term "shares or stocks" as used
in the Act was not limited only to corporations having a capital stock, or to
partnerships, but that it clearly covered the interests of members in jointstock companies and, likewise, mutual companies. The legal reserve never
represented indebtedness any more than the capital of a stock corporation
represents indebtedness. The member bore a relation to the mutual company
analogous to that which a stockholder bears to the joint-stock company in
which he holds stock. While no cases have been found in which the exact
question here raised has been adjudicated, numerous decisions have worked
out the interest of members of mutual companies in a manner similar to the
reasoning in the principal case. It has been held that the mutual company,
in so far as the interest of its policyholder is concerned, resembles the ordinary
corporation in relation to the stockholder therein? Other courts have held
that the interest of a member in a mutual company is somewhat in the nature
of a partnership interest. The insured becomes a member of the company by
virtue of his policy, entitled to a share of the profits, and responsible for
losses to the extent of his premium paid, or agreed to be paid. This analogy
has not been carried to the extent of holding that membership is attended by
all the liabilities of a partnership. Since courts have considered the member
'Lavoie v. Wooldridge, 79 N. H. 21, 104 AtI. 346 (1918).
'Revenue Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 306 § 207a, U. S. CoMP. STAT. (1918)
§ 63363h.
2
lbid.
'Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412, 105 N. W. 1031 (1906); 2 MAY, INSURANCE (4th ed. 1900) 549.
4Cf. Schimpf & Son v. Lehigh Valley Mutual Ins. Co., 86 Pa. 373, 376
(1878) ; Given v. Rettew, 162 Pa. 638; 640, 29 Atl. 703, 704 (1894).
'Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Hillyard, 37 N. J. L. 444 (1874); Cohen
v. N. Y. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5o N. Y. 6Io. 624 (1872).
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of a mutual company as having a share or interest similar to that of a shareholder in a corporation, or, as some have held, an interest analogous to that
of a member of a partnership, and since the Statute clearly regards as invested capital the paid-in value of stock in a corporation or of a share in a partnership, it is suggested that the court in the principal case properly held that
the paid-in legal reserve was invested capital, and, therefore, that the plaintiff
was exempt from the tax.
LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-AsSUMPTION

OF RISK ARISING FROM

DANGER-

ous PRsmIsEs-The defendant was a landlord, maintaining a bath room for
the common use of the persons to whom he let his rooms. The bathroom contained a gas heater and was unventilated. The wife of the plaintiff, a tenant,
was injured by asphyxiation. Two of the defenses were that the defendant
was ignorant of the danger of the existing condition, and that since the condition existed when the tenancy began and had remained unchanged, the plaintiff assumed the risk of the danger. Held: Plaintiff can recover. Gobrecht v.
Beckwith, 135 Atl. 2o (N. H. 1926).
A landlord who has reserved control over part of his property for the
common use of several tenants owes them the duty of seeing that such part
is maintained in a reasonably safe condition! But he is not liable unless he
has notice of the defect, or knowledge of facts from which such notice would
be implied. Where the tenant has such knowledge and continues to occupy
the premises, he is considered to have assumed the risk and cannot recover
for injury resulting therefrom.! In the present case the court decided that
there was sufficient evidence of the defendant's negligence and that he had
knowledge of the dangerous situation, and that as a matter of law the existence
of the condition at the beginning of the tenancy did not cause the tenant to
assume the risk. This last part of the holding was based on the authority
of Kambour v. Boston & Maine R. R? In that case a boy was injured in
jumping from a moving train, and the court decided that the mere voluntary
encounter of a known danger was not sufficient to cause him to assume the
risk so as to relieve the negligent defendant; that there must be some direct
expression, to the person who owes the duty, of the intention to assume the
risk. The opinion there cites some of the English master and servant cases.
which support this doctrine. These cases are grounded on the theory that
the servant's necessities create a pressure which destroys his free will, when
he is placed in a position where he must either encounter probable danger or give
up his employment.' The American cases have denied this effect. If it be
'Dunster v. Hollis [I918] 2 K. B. 795; Johnson v. Lembeck Brewing Co.,
75 N. J. L. 282, 68 At1. 85 (i9o7) ; Lewin v. Pauli, ig Pa. Super. 447 (19O2).
'Lynch v. Swan, 167 Mass. 510, 46 N. E. 5i (x897); Augevine v. Hewitson, 235 Mass. i26, 126 N. E. 425 (igzo); Dollard v. Roberts, 13o N. Y.
269, 29 N. E. 104 (89).
'Quinn v. Perham, 151 Mass. 162, 23 N. E. 735 (I89o); Marston v. Andler, 8o N. H. 564, 122 At. 329 (i923); Rooney v. Siletti, 96 N. J. L. 312, 115
At. 664 (I921).
'77 N. H. 33, 86 Atl. 624 (1913).
SBohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HAv. L. REV. 14 (I906).
5
Ibid.
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assumed that the doctrine of the Kambour case is sound, should it be applied
to the present case? There may well be circumstances such as house shortage,
economic necessity, or sickness where the pressure causing the tenant to continue encountering a danger should be taken into account. In the principal
case, however, the condition existed when the tenancy began and the reason
for the rule does not seem to apply. It is submitted, therefore, that the
case presents a misapplication of a doctrine which the majority of American
courts do not recognize.
ToRTs-TRsPASs AB INITIO--UNLAWFUL ACT OF PROHIBITION

OFFICER

ENTRY-Federal officers, acting under a valid search warrant, seized a quantity of liquor on the defendant's premises. Instead of keeping the property seized as required by law, only one quart was retained and
the rest summarily destroyed by the officers. At the trial, the defendant objected to the introduction of the quart in evidence on the ground that the unlawful act of the agents in destroying most of the property seized made their
original entry unlawful and the agents trespassers ab initio; and so the result would be that the liquor sought to be introduced was obtained unlawfully
by federal officers and should therefore be excluded in accordance with the
rule in the federal courts. Held: The liquor retained was properly received
in evidence. McGuire v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct, decided January 3,
AFTER RIGHTFUL

1927.

In refusing to permit the ancient holding of the Six Carpenters' Case'
to be invoked to defeat a prosecution by the government for illegal possession
of liquor, the Supreme Court affirms a doctrine established by several recent
cases in federal courts. Although some federal decisions have given slight
support to the contrary holding,' the weight of authority and better reason'
seem to enunciate principles in accord with the principal case. Several early
American cases,' in applying the doctrine of trespass ab initio, have used language to the effect that when an officer enters one's premises by authority of
law, since one is bound to admit him and can make no provision for one's
own security, an abuse of the legal power constitutes a forfeiture of the whole
protection which the law gives to the act which it allows. The general terms
used in these cases appear to be responsible for the minority holdings in the
federal courts, which, it is submitted, fail to recognize the fact that -e doctrine of trespass ab initio was a legal fiction created solely for the purpose of
'8 Coke 146 (16io).
2
Hurley v. United States, 3oo Fed. 75 (C. C. A. ist, 1924) ; United States
v. Clark, 298 Fed. 533 (S. D. Ala., 1924); In re Quirk, I F. (2d) 484 (W. D.
N. Y. 1924); CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1926) § 152.
' Godat v. McCarthy, 283 Fed. 689 (D. C. Mass., 1922) ; Murby v. United

States, 293 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923); United States v. Cooper, 295 Fed.
709 (D. C. Mass. 1924).
'Supra note 2. Cf. People v. Schregardus, 226 Mich. 279, 197 N. W. 573

(924).
'Esty v. Wilmot, 15 Gray 168, 169 (Mass, i86o) ; State v. Moore, 12 N.

H. 42 (841) ; Allen v. Crofoot, 5 Wend. 5o7 (N. Y. 1830).
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making possible a civil action of trespass against officers acting in excess of
their authorityE Where the original entry is without any authority of law,
it is well settled that evidence obtained thereby is excluded.? But where the
original entry is under authority of law, the citizen would appear to be adequately protected against an abuse of authority on the part of the officer by
having a civil action against the officer for the damage caused and by the officer's criminal responsibility.8 ,At least, the court in the principal case did not feel
that his protection should be increased to the extent of depriving the government of the benefit of evidence lawfully seized and retained.
TRUSTS-STATUTE

OF FRAUDS-ORAL AGREEMENT TO SPECULATE IN LAND-

The plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement to buy and sell a
tract of land and divide the profits equally. The agreement further provided
that the plaintiff would contribute his services in connection with the negotiations and that defendant would supply the purchase money, taking title to
the land in his own name. This plan was accordingly carried out and the
defendant subsequently conveyed the property for a nominal sum to a corporation of which the stock was nearly all owned by him. The land rose considerably in value and the plaintiff sued for a division of the profits that would
probably have been realized had not the defendant breached his oral contract.
Held: The plaintiff could not recover because the agreement was within the
Statute of Frauds. Davis v. Hillman, 288 Pa. 16, 135 At. 254 (1926).
Oral agreements pertaining to real property are within the exact purview
of the Statute of Frauds,2 except, by the weight of authority, when they are
entered into by partners. In such a case the interests of the partners are
interests in contingent profits and not interests in land and therefore not subject to the Statute.4 The court in the principal case held the oral agreement

255

"Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L. J. 147, 164 (1917).
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) ; Gouled v. United States,
U. S. 298 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921).
840 STAT. 228 (1917) §21, U. S. COMP. STAT. (igi8) § io496/4u.

'I Sm. L. (1772) 389 § 1, PA. STAT. (1920) §20192; P. L. 533 §4 (1856),
PA. STAT. (1920) § 20193.
2For an interesting account of the history of the English Statute see

Henning, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds and Their Authors,
61 U. OF PA. L. REv. 283 (1913). For list of states where the Statute is
in force, see BOGERT, TRUSTS (I92I) 55, n. 77; PERRY, TRUSTS (6th Ed. 191I)
§78, n. I.

'Thompson v. McKee, 43 Okla. 243, 142 Pac. 755 (1914) ; GILMoRE, PART-

NERSHIP (19i1) 94, n. 8o and cases there cited. Contra: Goldstein v. Nathan,
158 Ill. 641, 42 N. E. 72 (1895).

'Howell v. Kelly, 149 Pa. 473, 24 Atl.

224 (1892). See BRowNE, STATUTE
§261a, for an excellent explanation of this subject.
'Davis v. Hillman, 288 Pa. at 21, 135 At]. at 256. Professor Mechem puts
it thus: " . . . a single, isolated, casual purchase of land or chattels, by
persons not otherwise partners, with a view not to deal in the property as a
business, but merely to hold it until it can be sold at an advance, can rarely
be deemed to create a partnership." MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1924)
415.

OF FRAUDS (5th Ed.

I895)

RECENT CASES
created no relation of partnership or joint adventure and used the following
language:

".

.

. the land was not to be purchased for common account,'

nor was any portion of the consideration paid by the plaintiff,' nor did any
liability for possible losses attach."
It being assumed that no partnership
was created, the case then resolves itself into the question of whether a valid
oral trust can be created in land. Where there is an oral agreement to hold
land in trust, and if the land be sold to hold the proceeds in trust, a valid trust
as to the proceeds is created, if the land has been converted into money.'
But where the agreement remains executory, the promisor not having sold
the real property nor accounted for its proceeds, the breach of contract by
the promisor will not make him a constructive trustee; and the promise, furthermore, is voidable under the Statute of Frauds, a breach of it not being
fraud' It would, therefore, seem that the court in the principal case was correct in holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, since no actual
profits were ever realized by the defendant. There was, however, a dissenting
opinion which endeavored to distinguish the principal, case from the general
rule, on the ground that the defendant, in transferring the property for a
nominal consideration to the corporation, made the performance of his agreement with the plaintiff impossible, and thereby rendered himself liable as
a party failing to fulfill his contract. Such analogy would be sound provided
there was an enforceable contract. But, since an oral agreement to keep land
in trust for another is, under the Statute of Frauds, unenforceable,' it is
submitted the anology cannot be properly drawn.
'Is it, however, necessary that the land be purchased for common account? See LINDLEY, PARTaRSHIP (9th Ed. I924) 415.
But is it not sufficient consideration that one party puts his services or
labor or skill or learning against the money or property of the other? See
Chowing v. Graham, 74 Okla. 232, 178 Pac. 676 (i918).
8Yet the right to participate in profits normally implies a corresponding
liability for losses. Richardson v. Keely, 58 Colo. 47, i42 Pac. 167 (1914).
GILMoRE, op. cit. supra note 3, at § ii,

".

.

. sharing profits is prima facie

evidence of the existence of a partnership." See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Act
§7 (4).
Craft v. Craft, 74 Fla. 262, 76 So. 772 (917); Mohn v. Mohn, 112
Ind. 285, I6 N. E. 859 (1887) ; Chace v. Gardner, 228 Mass. 533, 117 N. E. 841
(1917). Contra: McGinnis v. Barton, 71 Iowa 644, 33 N. W. 152 (1887);
White v. McKenzie, 193 Mich. i89, 159 Pac. 367 (I916).
"Pearson v. Pearson, 125 Ind. 34 r , 25 N. E. 342 (i8go); Byers v. Mc-

Enery, 1i7 Iowa 499, 91 N. W. 797 (i9o); Grantham v. Conner, 97 Kan.
150, 154 Pac. 246 (1916); Walters v. Walters, 172 N. C. 328, 90 S. E. 304
(9ig6).
Contra: Bier v. Leisle, 172 Cal. 432, 156 Pac. 87o (i916).

lIbid.

